Abstract. We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a double auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance of traders, we find a non monotonic relationship of net returns of traders as a function of information levels, both in the experiments and in the simulations. Particularly, averagely informed traders perform worse than the non informed and only traders with high levels of information (insiders) are able to beat the market. The simulations and the experiments reproduce many stylized facts of tick-by-tick stock-exchange data, such as fast decay of autocorrelation of returns, volatility clustering and fat-tailed distribution of returns. These results have an important message for everyday life. They can give a possible explanation why, on average, professional fund managers perform worse than the market index. 
with D(0) = 0.2, where N (0, 1) is a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance. To achieve identical conditions, the same dividend process was used for all runs of the experiment.
Information setup
To value the shares, traders on the market got information about future dividends. The idea of Hellwig [6] was extended to nine information levels: different levels of information correspond to different lengths of windows in which one can predict future dividends. Trader I1 knows the dividend for the end of the current period, trader I2 knows the dividends for the current and the next period,
. . . , trader I9 for the current and the next eight periods [11, 12] . This way we got a cumulative information structure of the market where better informed agents know future dividends earlier than less informed ones. Since the market trading consists of several periods (new information entering the market in each), the design implies that information trickles down through the market from the best informed to the broad public over time.
The information that traders obtain is the present value of the stock conditioned on the forecasting horizon (E(V |I j,k )). This is calculated using Gordon's formula, discounting the known dividends and assuming the last one as an infinite stream which is also discounted. E(V |I j,k ) stands for the conditional present value of the asset in period k for the trader with information level j (Ij ).
where r e is the risk adjusted interest rate (E(· · · | · · ·) denotes the conditional average).
Before the beginning of the experiment an information level from one to nine (I1,. . . ,I9 ) was randomly assigned to each trader which he/she kept for the whole session.
There was one trader for each information level and this was public knowledge. At the beginning of each period new information was delivered to the traders depending on their level of information.
Results of the Experiments
The main interest is in how information affects the performance of traders. The net return of traders compared to the market return as a function of the information level can be seen in Fig. 1 , the results are the average I1  I2  I3  I4  I5  I6  I7  I8  I9  − of the seven experiments. One can verify that the returns do not grow monotonically with increasing information.
Traders having the first five levels of information do not outperform the average and only the best informed traders (insiders) are able to gain excess returns compared to the market [11, 12] . For a statistical comparison of performance of traders we ran the Wilcoxon rank sum test for equal medians [13, 14] , on the relative performance for pairs of information levels. The p-values of the tests can be found in Table 1 Since all information in the experiment is provided for free and is always correct, the result can not be due to information cost or wrong information. Furthermore, imple- 
The simulations
We carried out computer simulations to numerically reproduce the results of the experiments done with human beings. The simulations were run using MATLAB R programming language.
The market mechanism
In our simulation we programmed an essential double auction trading mechanism as it appears on most of real world financial markets, with a book containing the bid and ask orders. Since, in contrary to real world experiments, in a numerical simulation one has the possibility to analyse truly random traders, we implemented ten agents with different levels of information going from zero-information (random traders), I0 to I9, and with the possibility of using different trading strategies as will be discussed in details in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. In order to be able to estimate the error of our results we carried out 10000 runs in each simulation (100 sessions of 100 runs).
The simulation setup was very similar to the one in the experiments: the market contained a risky asset (stock) and a risk free bond (cash). Before beginning the simulation an information level was assigned to each of the ten agents (nine informed and one uninformed), thus having were paid on the shares held by the agents (the risk free interest rate was r f = 0.01, the risk adjusted interest rate r e = 0.05) and the book was cleared. We also carried out simulations without clearing the book and found that the clearing process does not make much difference in the results.
The dividend process (being the source of future information) was determined before the beginning of the trading.
Similarly to the experiments, the dividend process was a random walk of Gaussian steps: 
Information
Overall we implemented ten levels of information, a completely uninformed trader (random trader), I0 and nine informed traders with different levels of information from I1 to I9, where agent Ij has information of the dividends for the end of the current period and of (j −1) forthcoming periods (forecasting ability). The information received by traders was the present value of the stock conditional on the basis of their forecasting ability. This was determined by Gordon's formula (Eq. 2).
Trading strategies
At the beginning of each period agents submit orders according to their idea of the value of stocks. After that, during the period, in every second, one trader is chosen randomly who either accepts a limit order from the book (gives a market order) or puts a new limit order to the book.
Since we do not have exact information on how traders use their information in real world and in the experiments, we gave the possibility to simulated traders to strictly apply the fundamental information they get (fundamentalists), not to take any information in account except the current price, i.e. trade randomly (random traders)
or to look at other pieces of information such as trends (chartists). In this paper we show results for the case of fundamentalist and random traders, these strategies are described below. The details of the trading strategies and order placing mechanisms can be found on the web page:
http://www.phy.bme.hu/~bence
Fundamentalists
Fundamentalist traders strictly believe in the information they receive. If they find an ask order with a price lower or a bid order with a price higher than their estimated present value, i.e. E(V |I j,k ), they accept the limit order, otherwise they put a new limit order between the former best bid and best ask prices.
Random traders
Random traders put orders randomly. With probability 0.5 they put an ask (bid) order slightly higher (lower) than the current price.
Results
In our simulations we focused on the effect of information on the performance of agents throughout the market session. We also analysed the results from the point of view of stylized facts of stock markets. In order to reduce statistical errors we carried out 10000 runs of the simulation.
Final wealth as a function of information
The final return relative to that of the whole market can be seen in Fig. 2 a curve we call J-curve. The agents having average level of information (I1-I5 ) perform worse than the completely uninformed random agent (I0 ). The best informed agents outperform the market. (Besides common sense, the latter can be justified also using mathematics, since compared to the market index the simulation is a zero sum game. If the non-informed gets more or less the market return and the averagely informed are losers, then the well-informed must get excess gain.). To test the hypothesis of the J-curve we ran the Wilcoxon rank sum test for equal medians [13, 14] , on the relative performance for pairs of information levels. The p-values of the tests can be found in Table 2 .
One can see that the hypothesis of returns for different information levels being drawn from the same population can be excluded in almost all cases at the 0.05 significance level. This result and its relevance to real markets will be discussed further in Section 5. 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* I6 0.144 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* I7 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* I8 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.009* I9 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.001* 0.057**
To understand why the random trader gets almost ex- Table 3 we show the relative performance 
Stylized facts
We analysed the results of our simulations from the point Table 4 we have reported the first four moments of the log-return distribution for tick-bytick General Electric (GE) prices in October 1999 (55559 data points). In Figure 5 , for these data, the autocorre- lation of signed and absolute log-returns is plotted as in Figure 4 . From Table 4 it can be seen that the distribution function of absolute returns in the simulation is leptokurtic, similarly to real world data, even if the kurtosis is lower. Running the Jarque-Bera test, for goodness-of-fit to a normal distribution [16] , we can rule out the normality of the distribution of the absolute returns for both cases.
When testing for the stylized facts, we also studied markets with only random agents trading and we found similar stylized facts; thus we can state that these empirical facts are effects mainly due to the continuous double auction trading mechanism as it has been mentioned before in Ref.
[17].
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a model of an experimental and a simulated double auction stock market with cumulative information delivered to traders. We focused on the value of information for the traders, in case of several informa- It is important to stress, that while heterogeneous beliefs of agents are necessary for trading (if all agents had the same expectations, no one would find it attractive to trade), we were able to reproduce the J-curve of the experiments in our simulations by implementing fundamentalist strategy. Thus it is enough to assume that traders use the information they possess to get the non monotonic relationship of net returns of traders as a function of information levels.
